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Background: Monitoring the progress of the Integrated Disease Surveillance (IDS) strategy is an important
component to ensure its sustainability in the state of Maharashtra in India. The purpose of the study was to
document the baseline performance of the system on its core and support functions and to understand the
challenges for its transition from an externally funded “project” to a state owned surveillance “program”.
Methods: Multi-centre, retrospective cross-sectional evaluation study to assess the structure, core and support
surveillance functions using modified WHO generic questionnaires. All 34 districts in the state and randomly
identified 46 facilities and 25 labs were included in the study.
Results: Case definitions were rarely used at the periphery. Limited laboratory capacity at all levels compromised
case and outbreak confirmation. Only 53% districts could confirm all priority diseases. Stool sample processing was
the weakest at the periphery. Availability of transport media, trained staff, and rapid diagnostic tests were main
challenges at the periphery. Data analysis was weak at both district and facility levels. Outbreak thresholds were
better understood at facility level (59%) than at the district (18%). None of the outbreak indicator targets were met
and submission of final outbreak report was the weakest. Feedback and training was significantly better (p < 0.0001)
at district level (65%; 76%) than at facility level (15%; 37%). Supervision was better at the facility level (37%) than at
district (18%) and so were coordination, communication and logistic resources. Contractual part time positions,
administrative delays in recruitment, and vacancies (30%) were main human resource issues that hampered system
performance.
Conclusions: Significant progress has been made in the core and support surveillance functions in Maharashtra,
however some challenges exist. Support functions (laboratory, transport and communication equipment, training,
supervision, human and other resources) are particularly weak at the district level. Structural integration and
establishing permanent state and district surveillance officer positions will ensure leadership; improve performance;
support continuity; and offer sustainability to the program. Institutionalizing the integrated disease surveillance
strategy through skills based personnel development and infrastructure strengthening at district levels is the only
way to avoid it from ending up isolated! Improving surveillance quality should be the next on agenda for the state.
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Epidemiologic surveillance is the “on going systemic col-
lection, analysis, and interpretation of health data
essential to the planning, implementation, and evaluation
of public health practice, closely integrated with the timely
dissemination of these data to those who need to know.
The final link in the surveillance chain is the application
of these data to prevention and control. A surveillance
system includes a functional capacity for data collection,
analysis, and dissemination linked to public health
programs” [1]. Today, surveillance attains importance
more than ever given the stark reductions in travel
times that essentially catalyze the spread of emerging
pathogens and the introduction of existing ones to
new areas. Present day surveillance systems chase
moving targets in terms of both evolving pathogens and
adapting hosts, in the backdrop of rapidly changing social
and economic human environments [2].
Strategies in communicable disease surveillance:
single - vertical vs. multiple integrated:
Surveillance is largely interpreted and implemented as “a
component” within vertical single disease control programs
in most low and middle income countries including India
[3]. Especially because not all countries are able to allocate
resources for surveillance and decision makers often
hesitate to prioritize outbreak detection when curative
needs are barely met [4]. Evidence suggests that heavily
centralized, vertical single disease control programs
although resource (personnel, equipment, and financial)
intensive tend to be effective and are well implemented
[5]. Nonetheless, several drawbacks have been identified
with these programs and chief amongst them being their
inability to fulfill surveillance functions adequately. Majority
of them are heavily centralized and offer sub-optimal speed
of surveillance, largely inadequate to detect outbreaks in a
timely manner [6,7]. Duplication of efforts across multiple
un-coordinated single disease control programs overburdens
sub-national staff and are a waste of valuable resources
[8,9]. Last but not the least, vertical programs are heavily
autonomous in their functioning and often non-flexible,
preventing their integration at any level and making them
unsustainable and unaffordable in the long run [10].
Failure of vertical single disease control strategies to
overcome the global burden of communicable diseases
despite the monetary investments and the emergence of
newer challenges to disease control, prompted the WHO
to develop and advocate an Integrated approach to
Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) in 1998 [11].
Integrated disease surveillance is “a combination of active
and passive systems that use a single infrastructure to
gather information about multiple diseases or behaviours
of interest using similar structures, personnel and processes”
[12]. The strategy aims to “strengthen surveillance andresponse at each level of the health system by building
local capacities; leveraging strengths and expertise through
partnerships and coordination; training personnel at all
levels; mobilizing resources; integrating existing multiple
disease-specific surveillance systems to ensure efficient
use of resources; improve the use and flow of surveillance
information; strengthen laboratory capacity; emphasize
community and clinician participation; use data thresholds
to trigger alerts and above all link surveillance; laboratory
confirmation; and other data to public health actions”
[13-15]. IDSR “recognizes that different diseases have
specialized surveillance needs, and exploits opportunities
for synergies in carrying out core and support functions”
[16]. However, the capability of existing disease control
programs to complement each other eventually determines
the success of this approach.
Forty six member states of the WHO-AFRO have
adopted the integrated disease surveillance strategy since
1998. As of 2010, 86% of the 4386 districts in 45 countries
in the region have implemented IDSR in one form or
the other [17]. A systematic review of evidence from
18 countries indicates mixed experiences [18]. Limited
information is available on the number and status of
countries adopting it in the WHO SEARO region including
in India, although a regional strategic plan (2002–2010)
for integrated disease surveillance was developed and
adopted in 2002 [19].
Disease burden and the Integrated approach to
communicable Disease Surveillance (IDS) in India:
Like most other lower-middle income countries, India
has to brave its path through the daunting triple burden
of communicable diseases (the old elephant), chronic
non-communicable diseases (the emerging dinosaur) and
weak overburdened health care system largely incapable
of combating the two simultaneously [20,21]. With a
population of over 1.21 billion and a decadal growth rate
of 15.9%, by sheer numbers India bears a large part of the
global burden of communicable disease and potential
hosts [10]. Infectious diseases contribute to about 26% of
the disease burden in India [22]. Together with maternal,
perinatal and nutritional disorders, infectious diseases
constitute 38% of the total deaths (predominantly in rural
areas) [23]. Additionally emerging infections like Gp-B
rota virus, nipah virus, and chandipura virus pose separate
challenges [24]. Although disease trends for poliomyelitis,
tuberculosis, neonatal tetanus, measles and HIV and AIDS
in the country are decreasing, those for dengue, chikun-
gunya, HIV and TB co-infections, cholera 0139, japanese
encephalitis, leptospirosis and novel H1N1 infections are
on the rise [23].
India adopted the Integrated Disease Surveillance (IDS)
strategy in 2004 following the limited success and eventual
discontinuation of the National Surveillance Program for
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phase one, nine pilot states implemented the strategy
through the World Bank funded Integrated Disease
Surveillance Project (IDSP), 2005–2012. The strategy was
expanded to all 29 states in a phased out manner under
the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), funded by
core domestic state budgets [25].
The IDSP in India is a three-tier decentralized state based
system, covering 13 mandatory diseases and syndromes
with a focus on the districts (Additional file 1). Additionally
states are allowed to add up to five state specific conditions
for surveillance [26]. The National (NSU), State (SSU) and
District Surveillance Units (DSU) are the organizational
structures, each headed by a surveillance officer and
supported by epidemiologists, microbiologists, data
entry operators and data managers. There are over 604
DSUs in the country, 35 SSU- one each at the respective
state headquarters which directly report to the NSU
based at the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC
former National Institute for Communicable Diseases
NICD) in Delhi [27].
IDSP uses syndromic, presumptive and lab confirmation
approaches to collect data on cases of priority diseasesFigure 1 Organizational structure of the IDSP system in Maharashtra,through S, P and L reporting formats respectively from
identified public and private reporting units on a weekly
basis in both urban and rural areas as shown in Figure 1.
Data is collected on paper based forms up to the DSU
level where it is electronically transferred to the state and
central levels through the IDSP portal and via Email [28].
The study aimed to assess the structure and performance
of the Integrated Disease Surveillance System in the
Maharashtra state of India, which was a consistent pilot
state for both of the only two national level surveillance
efforts in the country - namely the NSPCD and the IDSP.
Infectious diseases contribute to over 50% burden of
disease in the state [29]. Since IDSP was implemented in
Maharashtra in 2005 it was in its early stages of independent
operation in 2011 and assessing its progress was important
to ensure its sustainability. Documenting the baseline
performance was necessary for future comparisons. The
World Bank funding was to conclude in March 2012 in
all nine pilot states including Maharashtra. Therefore,
IDSP was in transition from an externally funded “project”
to a state owned state run surveillance “program” for the
first time- mandating a review of the lessons learned. The
study also aimed to understand the challenges forIndia.
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trict health care machinery and to make recommendations
for a smooth transition.
Methods
Study area
Maharashtra, the second largest state in India covers a
population of 112 million and is organized administratively
into eight health circles covering 33 districts and a large
Mumbai urban metropolitan area (Figure 2). All 34 (100%)
DSUs were included in the survey at the state level. An
onsite visit was conducted in ten (30%) randomly identified
districts with care to include at least one district from
each of the eight health circles. Mumbai being the only
urban unit was purposively sampled.
Study design and sampling
Multi-centre, retrospective cross-sectional evaluation study
was conducted along four key areas namely- objec-
tives, structure and components of the system; core
surveillance functions; support surveillance functions and
quality attributes. Modified versions of the WHO protocol
for assessing national surveillance systems [30]; WHO
guide to assessing disease surveillance and response sys-
tems [31]; CDC 2001 updated guidelines [32] and the
2004 framework [33] for evaluating public health surveil-
lance systems; and the WHO framework for evaluating
communicable disease surveillance systems [34] were usedFigure 2 Study area.to design the study protocols (Figure 3). Core functions in-
cluded nine aspects namely case detection; case registration;
case confirmation; case notification; data management;
data analysis; outbreak preparedness; outbreak response;
and feedback. Support functions included six aspects
namely manuals and guidelines, laboratory capacity;
supervision; training; resources (financial, human, material
and equipment) and coordination. Results of the system’s
attributes are described elsewhere [18].
Multi-stage simple random sampling was done. At
each of the ten districts a list of all S, P and L Reporting
Units (RUs) was obtained and the facilities were ranked
based on the reproductive and child health indicators.
Of the top five ranking facilities, one Rural (RH) or
Sub-District Hospital (SDH), two Primary Health care
Centres (PHCs) were randomly identified. Once at the
PHC, one subcenter was randomly identified for a
visit. A Government Medical College (GMC) hospital
was included in the study when available. A total of 46
facilities (6 GMCs, 8 RHs, 16 PHCs and 16 subcenters);
and 25 laboratories (10 PHC; 8 RH and 7 referral labora-
tories (RL)) were visited.
Data collection
Secondary data included record review at the state, district,
facility and laboratory levels particularly on the IDSP data
portal, print manuals, official correspondence and reports,
weekly S, P and L forms, results of data analysis, meeting
Figure 3 Scope of the assessment study (Source modified from[ 34]).
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outbreak investigations and response, annual audit reports,
daily diaries at subcenters, outpatient, inpatient and
laboratory registers at facilities. Primary data was collected
through structured interviews administered in person in
the ten districts and electronically via Email (followed up
by a telephone call) in 24 districts after obtaining consent.
Feedback was provided to each district via Email. Results
of the primary data analyses were presented to the state
and 34 district surveillance officers for validation.Data analysis
Primary and secondary data were entered, cleaned and
analyzed in Microsoft™ ExcelW 2010. Frequency distribu-
tions were calculated for all variables and identified indica-
tors. Data from the structured questionnaires were then
imported in SPSSW version 17 for univariate and bivariate
analysis. Mann–Whitney test was performed on responses
from the electronic and visited district questionnaires and
no significant differences were observed.Study limitations
The study was conducted in collaboration with the SSU.
In order to counter the fear of disciplinary action if
deficiencies were identified, the respondents were assured
of anonymity and confidentiality. The focus of the assess-
ment was on lesson learning and constructive criticism
which was highlighted before every interview with support
from the SSU.Ethics approval
The study was a part of the doctoral dissertation of the
lead author and was passed through the ethical committee
of the Medical Faculty, University of Heidelberg, Germany
(Approval Number: S381/2010) and by the University
of Delhi, India (Approval Number: Anth/2009/585).
In addition relevant clearances were also obtained
from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and the
National Institute of Communicable Diseases to conduct
the assessment.
Results
Assessment of the structure of IDSP
A review of the current structure of IDSP against the ori-
ginal project implementation plans at the national and state
levels revealed that several aspects have been modified over
the last seven years. Chief amongst them were:
 Lab structure changed from L1 (primary), L2
(secondary) and L3 (tertiary) to L reporting units.
 Referral lab structure (2010) with ten identified
government teaching hospital labs
 Strengthening of the District Public Health
Laboratories (DPHL) for routine surveillance
not done
 Modification of conditions under surveillance- TB
and HIV, traffic accidents and air pollution were
removed and H1N1 and H5N1 added.
 The reporting formats have been changed thrice in
the life of the project
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eliminated at state level
 One week grace period provided for portal data
entry
 State surveillance unit was non-functional from June
2008 to June 2009
 No annual trainings conducted despite 8% of total
state budget earmarked
 No mandatory supervisory strategy in spite of
quarterly provision in original plans
 Trigger levels for outbreak response revised from
1–3 to 1–5
Core functions
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the inter-facility
and facility- district differences in core and support
function performance of the IDSP in the state.
Case detection and registration
Standard case definitions were available in English only
and were regularly used by thirty one (67%) facilities.
There were no IDSP registers at subcenters but records of
patients attended were maintained in a daily diary. AllTable 1 Assessment of the core surveillance functions [n (%)]
Subcenter (16)
Case Detection
Availability of Standard Case Definitions (SCDs) 10 (62)
SCDs stated correctly 16 (100)
Case Registration
Complete IPD registers -
Complete OPD registers 10 (62)
Case Confirmation/ Notification
Capacity to transport specimens to higher lab 12 (75)
Lack of one or more of six reporting forms 13 (81) S forms onl
Correct definition of “reporting week” 2 (12)
Data Analysis
Summarize and present data in a table 2 (12)
Perform trend analysis (regular data) 2 (12)
Calculate incidence and prevalence of diseases 0 (0)
Availability of accurate denominators 12 (75)
Outbreak Detection
Compare present and previous data 14 (88)
Have an action threshold for the state’s priority diseases 9 (56)
Stated correct threshold (Measles, Cholera, Diphtheria) 8 (50)
Outbreak Response
Manual for standard case management 12 (75)
Prevention and control measures based on local data 16 (100)
Received Feedback 2 (12)other 30 facilities maintained outpatient (OPD) and in-
patient (IPD) registers and 29 (97%) produced them for
inspection. IPD registers were more complete than OPD
registers. Registers were incomplete in larger facilities
particularly with respect to the diagnosis and address of
the patient reportedly due to the high volume of patients
and unavailability of computer literate staff.Case confirmation
At the district level, thirty (88%) districts maintained a
documented list of referral laboratories and twenty nine
(85%) acknowledged a mechanism for timely referral of
samples. Eighteen (53%) districts had laboratory capacity
to confirm all identified diseases. Others referred samples
to higher public laboratories, or in cases of emergencies,
used private labs. Six of the 16 PHCs visited did not
have a lab. All 46 facilities (100%) performed blood
smear examination for malaria, 36 (78%) performed
Ziehl Neelson stain for sputum, and 27 (59%) stool for
microscopy. Cerebro Spinal Fluid (CSF) examination for
meningitis was performed only at the referral labs due
to lack of qualified staff and availability of appropriate
equipment at periphery. Capacity of the facilities toPHC (16) GMC (6) RH (8) Facility Total (46) District Total (34)
10 (62) 1 (17) 3 (37) 24 (52) 29 (85)
13 (81) 2 (33) 7 (87) 38 (82) -
10 (62) 3 (50) 5 (62) 18 (39) -
10 (62) 2 (33) 2 (25) 14 (30) -
14 (87) 5 (83) 8 (100) 39 (85) 29 (85)
y 7 (44) 2 (33) 4 (50) 13 (28) 13 (38)
3 (19) 2 (33) 0 (0) 7 (14) 15 (44)
4 (25) 4 (67) 1 (12) 11 (24) 34 (100)
3 (19) 1 (17) 0 (0) 6 (13) 28 (82)
3 (19) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (6) 17 (50)
16 (100) 2 (33) 3 (37) 33 (72) 26 (76)
10 (62) 1 (17) 3 (37) 28 (61) 27 (80)
15 (94) 4 (67) 6 (75) 34 (74) 14 (41)
10 (62) 3 (50) 2 (25) 23 (50) 6 (18)
14 (87) 4 (67) 7 (87) 37 (80) 21 (62)
16 (100) 2 (33) 7 (87) 41 (89) 20 (59)
2 (12) 1 (17) 2 (25) 7 (15) 22(65)
Table 2 Assessment of the support surveillance functions [n (%)]
Subcenter (16) PHC (16) GMC (6) RH (8) Facility Total (46) District Total (34)
Availability of technical guidelines and manuals 3 (19) 3 (19) 0 (0) 1 (12) 7 (15) 23 (67)
Supervision 7(44) 7(44) 2 (33) 1 (12) 17 (37) 6 (18)
Training 6 (37) 6 (37) 2 (33) 3 (37) 17 (37) 26 (76)
Coordination
Coordination mechanism/ body 10 (62) 13 (81) 3 (50) 5 (62) 31 (67) 22 (65)
IDSP focal person 13 (81) 14 (87) 6 (100) 8 (100) 41 (89) 30 (88)
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blood (93%), than for sputum (74%), and stool (41%)
samples. Majority of the facilities referred the patient
rather than sending samples due to unavailability of
functional cold chain (71%) and appropriate transport
media (50%). Thirteen (38%) districts and seven (15%)
facilities reported delays in case and outbreak detections
either due to lack of trained laboratory staff or lack of
equipment and reagents.Case notification
Majority of the districts (33, 97%) received data hand
delivered in paper based formats. Twenty-three (68%)
districts additionally accepted verbal reporting via mobile/
cell phones without a formal mechanism to document it.
All DSUs transmitted data to the state via Email or the
IDSP portal. Ten (29%) districts experienced regular
problems with IDSP portal function or Internet connectivity
and preferred sending data by email over using the portal.
However, the districts and number varied from one week
to the other depending on availability of electricity, pres-
ence of data entry operators, and functional computers.Data management
Few districts (44%) and facilities (15%) calculated the
“reporting week” correctly (Monday to Sunday) despite
the schedule been provided and made available on the
IDSP portal. Majority (41%) of the facilities followed
“Sunday to Saturday” schedule since they were expected
to submit data latest by Monday morning to the DSU.
About 85% districts accepted reports through the next
week. The correct deadline (Tuesday) for district to state
reporting was stated by 71% districts.
All subcenters photocopied S forms weekly. At the
PHC/GMC/RH level forms were electronically filled and
printouts taken. No additional costs for photocopies or
printouts were available and therefore the staff hesitated
to maintain office copies of the submitted forms. Office
copies for 14% S forms, 32% L forms and 33% P forms
were missing for the 13 weeks reviewed during data
accuracy verification.Data analysis
Although the facility registers recorded the date, age,
location, and gender of the patient, IDSP reporting
formats and portal entry system does not include these
attributes in regular data. Line graphs were frequently
available at the district levels for malaria (62%) than for
acute diarrheal disease (29%) and syndromic fevers
(23%). Thirty (88%) districts cited lack of time as the main
reason for not performing disease trends for regular data.Outbreak detection
Majority of the districts (76%) relied on syndromic data
(S forms) as compared presumptive data (P forms) (59%)
to detect unusual clustering or increase in the number
of cases. At the facility level majority (30, 65%) used
routine analysis of their own data to detect outbreaks. Few
districts (23%) and facilities (22%) used lab confirmation
(L forms) to detect outbreaks. In addition, 17 (50%)
districts scanned media reports and 22 (64%) captured
information from the community. Twenty- five (73%)
districts maintained a rumour register and 22 (65%)
updated it. The register was observed in four of the ten
(40%) visited districts. Over 90% of the facilities visited did
not maintain a rumour register. Majority of the districts
(91%) and facilities (86%) prioritized proper case manage-
ment over reporting to the next level indicating a preference
for curative tendencies.Outbreak/ epidemic preparedness and response
All districts had a rapid response team (RRT) and 24
(71%) had a clearly defined Epidemic Management
Committee (EMC). Twenty seven (79%) districts had a
written plan for response although few (23%) had evaluated
it. Five of the 10 (50%) visited districts were able to
provide a physical copy for verification. Fourteen (41%)
districts had a method in place to forecast an outbreak of
the 13 diseases based on institutional learning and analysis
of previous data. Significant number of districts (88%) had
access to emergency stocks of drugs and supplies at all
times in past year which was confirmed in nine of the ten
(90%) visited districts. Few districts (18%) experienced
shortage of drugs, vaccines or supplies during the most
Phalkey et al. BMC Public Health 2013, 13:575 Page 8 of 15
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/13/575recent outbreak. Twenty four (71%) districts had a clearly
defined budget line or access to funds for outbreak
response and half of them rated the amount as adequate.
Twenty two (65%) districts stated that administrative
delays made the funds less accessible despite availability.
All districts requested clear guidelines for use of vehicles
and fuel allowance during outbreaks. The Case Fatality
Rates for the total outbreaks reported in the state
during 2010 and 2011 for all diseases were within WHO
acceptable limits.
Thirty-one (91%) districts reported a suspected outbreak
in the last 6 months of which 24 responded within 48 hrs
and all looked for risk factors. None of the three identified
program outbreak indicators were met at 80% target but
significant improvements have been recorded from
2009–2012 (Figure 4). Submission of the final outbreak
report was the weakest. A majority of the districts (62%)
and facilities (80%) had access to a written standard case
management protocol. Four (40%) of ten visited districts
and an equal number of facilities (41%) were able to
provide a physical copy. All 34 districts reported use of
outbreak data for action in the past year which included
additional rounds of water purification, container surveys,
health promotion and population awareness, stockpiling
medications; preventive measures such as mass chemo-
prophylaxis for diphtheria and a doxycycline prophylaxis
strategy in the district following increase in the incidence
of leptospirosis in the last three years.
Feedback
No formal mechanism for feedback existed at any level.
Periodic “Weekly Epidemiological Alerts” were dissemi-
nated by the SSU in 2010 but stopped once the epidemi-
ologist proceeded on leave. Feedback from the state to the
districts was significantly higher than the feedback from
the districts to the facilities (p < .0001). Feedback was
more frequently provided by email / official report (86%)
followed by verbal communication (73%). Thirty facilities
(83%) provided feedback to the communities and 18 (47%)Figure 4 Outbreak indicator performance of the system (2009–2012).provided evidence for it. Feedback at all levels was ad hoc;
clustered around a suspected/ confirmed outbreak, not
given to all RUs or districts and there was no specific
schedule or budget identified.Support functions
Standards and guidelines
Surveillance manuals on the IDSP portal were not up-to
date, difficult to understand and available only in English
language. Medical officer’s manual developed under the
IDSP was available in six (15%) of the 30 facilities and
half of them were able to produce a physical copy for
review. As per the manual a data tally sheet is to be
maintained by the pharmacist within every facility-
however this is not followed up at any level within the
program. This sent mixed signals to the staff as to which
part of the manuals was to be strictly followed and
which not, which version is the latest and when these
are updated or changed.Laboratory capacity
There was a stark discrepancy in the tests performed
and practices at the PHC, RH and RL levels (Table 3).
Generally, at the PHC level only blood smear examin-
ation for malaria, Widal test for typhoid, and sputum
smear examinations for tuberculosis were done. All
other tests the patients were referred to private labs or
to the District Public Health Laboratory (DPHL). Even
the RLs did not conduct all tests as expected (Table 4)
despite the provision of additional annual funds and
equipment. Most peripheral lab staff were hired on a
contractual basis and IDSP did not provide additional lab
personnel or training at any level. Stringent procurement
requirements have delayed equipment purchase at RL and
non-provision of additional staff or incentives leads to
overburdening of regular staff that refused to work for
IDSP cases.
Table 3 Assessment of the laboratory structures [n (%)]
PHC (10) RH (8) Referral (7) Total (25)
Samples labelled adequately 10 (100) 7 (87) 6 (86) 23 (92)
Copies of reports available 10 (100) 5 (52) 2 (29) 17 (68)
Manual for test procedures 7 (70) 6 (75) 3 (43) 16 (64)
Temperature sheets (refrigerators, freezers and incubators) 0 (0) 1 (12) 4 (57) 5 (20)
Accurately labelled reagents 4 (40) 0 (0) 4 (57) 8 (32)
Accurate reagent expiry dates 6 (60) 0 (0) 4 (57) 10 (40)
Adequate gloves 8 (80) 7 (87) 6 (85) 21 (84)
Sharps container with disinfectant 4 (40) 5 (62) 2 (29) 11 (44)
Functional bio-waste disposal system 8 (80) 7 (87) 6 (86) 21 (84)
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There were no guidelines on the required/expected
number of supervisory visits at any level. Common reasons
identified for inadequate and irregular supervisions were
additional responsibilities at district (24, 70%); lack of funds
(12, 35%); lack of staff at the DSU (11, 32%); not
mandatory (9, 26%); and vehicle availability (30, 88%). A
majority 16 (47%) districts and 24 (52%) facilities reported
that a mandatory quarterly visit from the next level will
improve reporting and provide much needed assurance
that the work of peripheral staff was appreciated.Table 4 Diagnostic tests performed at Referral Labs [n (%)]






Typhoid Serological tests (TyphiDot/Widal)
Typhoid
5 (71)





Bacterial meningitis: Rapid latex agglutination test 1 (14)
CSF examination-wet mount 7 (100)
Gram stain and culture 7 (100)
Antimicrobial sensitivity 7 (100)
Hepatitis A/E IgM μ capture ELISA 1 (14)
Measles IgM μ capture ELISA 1(14)
Dengue IgM μ capture ELISA 4 (57)
Dengue Antigen detection 1 (14)
Diphtheria Smear examination 7 (100)
Culture 5 (71)
Leptospirosis ELISA 1(14)
Rapid test 2 (29)
Chikungunya National Institute of Virology Kits 1 (14)
Malaria Rapid DT 1 (14)Training
Training was significantly higher at the district level
compared to the facility levels (p < .0001). IDSP focal
person at 17 (50%) districts had a degree in public health.
In nearly half of the districts none of the subordinate staff
was trained in integrated disease surveillance (Table 5).
Often it was DSO and the epidemiologist who were trained
in the two-week FETP course. Duration of training of the
data entry operators was typically two days and the
last training for health assistants and data managers
at any level was conducted in 2006 despite 8% of
the annual budget (approximately US$ 66,480 in 2011)
being earmarked for it. The main reason identified by 23
(68%) districts for lack of trained staff was vacant state
training consultant position and lack of an adequate train-
ing strategy at any level. Trained personnel were either
transferred to another facility or have left jobs due to con-
tractual positions (7, 21% districts). Other causes included
lack of funds at the district level (19, 56%); and training not
mandatory (13, 38%). No updated database of trained staff
in position was available at the district or state headquar-
ters, which made accurate estimations difficult. EDUSAT a
satellite based audio-visual educational network established
between the CSU and the 34 DSUs and selected tertiary
medical teaching RUs aimed to cover training component.
However, the equipment was installed in 40 of the 58
identified sites and was functional only in 31 sites.Table 5 Human resources and training status
Positions Sanctioned Filled Trained
Epidemiologist 36 22 20
Microbiologist 3 2 2
Entomologist 1 0 0
Training Consultant 1 0 0
Finance Consultant 1 1 1
Data Manager 36 22 21
Data Entry Operator 59 46 3
Total 137 93 (68) 47 (50)
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Financial resources were adequately available in the state
and an average of 46.14% under spending of sanctioned
funds was observed over the last seven years. Despite
which, at the state level forty four (32.2%) of the 137
sanctioned positions under the IDSP were vacant as of
January 2011 (Table 5). Frequent transfer and turnover
of staff at all levels are major hindrance for program
progress. The State Surveillance Officer (SSO) position
was an additional charge assigned to an Additional District
Health Officer (ADHO) who also heads two other major
state health programs.
Despite the availability of ear marked annual budgets
no regular training or supervisory visits were conducted.
Availability of logistic and communication resources
were better at facilities than at district surveillance units
(Table 6). In general most facilities were provided with
express feeders under the NRHM. Only one of the
subcenter’s with a new building did not have electricity.
Availability of vehicles was a major issue in over 90% of
the districts and unclear guidelines on spending available
funds left it to the interpretation of the higher authorities
for their use. Despite availability of vehicles, guidelines for
their use and persons eligible for using them were unclear.
Fuel charges had to be first borne by the DSO and
epidemiologist and it took months for reimbursement.
Secondly, unclear and non-standardized guidelines on theTable 6 Resources available at facilities and District Surveillan
Sub centre (16) PHC (16) RH
Logistics
24x7 Electricity 15 (94) 16 (100) 8 (
Inverter 5 (31) 14 (87) 8 (
Vehicles - 16 (100) 6 (
Data Management
Stationery 14 (87) 16 (100) 8(1
Calculator 12 (75) 15 (94) 6 (
Printers - 16 (100) 7 (
Communication
Telephone service/ 1 (6) 13 (81) 8 (
Fax - - 4 (
Computers with Internet - 16 (100) 7 (
IEC Materials
Posters 7 (44) 7 (44) 1 (
Megaphone 10 (62) 10 (62) 2
VCR and TV/Projector* - 14 (87) 5 (
Hygiene and sanitation materials
Spray Pump 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (
Disinfectant 12 (75) 15 (94) 7 (
Protection Material 13 (81) 15 (94) 7 (
*VCR and TV set at facility/ Projector at district.payment of Travel Allowance and Daily Allowance
(TA/DA) proved detrimental for the motivation to
conduct supervisory visits and outbreak investigations.
Coordination
Minutes/reports of the co-ordination committee were
available at four (40%) of ten visited districts and eight
(17%) facilities.
Discussion
The implementation of IDSP in all 34 districts of the
state although encouraging, is only partially satisfactory.
Significant progress has been made but gaps remain and
the current transition of the system offers a unique
opportunity to implement the necessary structural
changes and should be exploited to its potential. The use
of the Standard Case Definitions (SCDs) was poor at the
periphery hinting that the syndromic SCDs need clarifi-
cations. All SCDs should be made available in Marathi
language instead of the current “only English” versions
in order to improve their use [27,35]. Further, the
reporting deadlines and definition of a reporting week
were poorly understood affecting reporting quality. Annual
circulation of job aids with SCDs and reporting deadlines
should be implemented to improve data collection and
reporting as demonstrated from studies in Tanzania,
Mozambique, Uganda and Ghana [36-40].ce Units (DSU) respectively [n (%)]
(8) GMC (6) Facility total (46) District total (34)
100) 6 (100) 45 (98) 22 (65)
100) 2 (33) 29 (63) 16 (47)
75) 2 (33) 24/30 (80) 6 (18)
00) 3 (50) 41 (89) 27 (79)
75) 3 (50) 36 (78) 28 (82)
87) 4 (67) 27/30 (90) 2 (76)
100) 5 (83) 27/30 (90) 21 (62)
50) 3 (50) 7/15 (50) 17 (50)
87) 3 (50) 26/30 (87) 32 (94)
12) 1 (17) 16 (35) 12 (35)
(25) 0 (0) 22 (48) 2 (6)
62) 2 (33) 21/30 (70) 23 (68)
75) 2 (33) 8 (17) 7 (21)
87) 2 (33) 36 (78) 15 (44)
87) 2 (33) 37 (80) 10 (29)
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and at the peripheral level, a finding similar to other
studies from Mozambique and Uganda [39,41]. Lack of
reporting formats and office copies of reports sent
thereof compromised data verification and institutional
learning. Staff at periphery printed or used photocopies at
their own costs. At state level, storage and distribution of
large quantities of printed formats was a logistic problem
and therefore provisions in local contingency funds should
be made at district/facility levels for printing them.
Alternately, printed IDSP registers should be considered
at all levels to ensure adequate standardization and
documentation at source [27,42-44]. Second, the system
does not currently collect data on disease mortality which
should be addressed in the next restructuring [45].
Weak lab infrastructures at periphery compromise
regular and outbreak surveillance functions and have
been reported earlier from Tanzania, Ethiopia and South
Sudan [2,6,46]. The PHCs are the first contact for diag-
nostics in rural areas, and 37% of them did not have a
lab facility in our study. Further, only half of the districts
could confirm all the priority diseases. Sample collection
and transport was the weakest for stool samples, even
when the maximum outbreaks and the burden from
diarroheal diseases remained high in every district. Staff
in referral labs was hesitant in processing samples from
periphery due to inadequate, inappropriate or contaminated
samples. Availability of transport media and cold chain
boxes for sample transport needs immediate attention
even in the light of vaccination programs such as polio.
Annual cold chain audits should be considered for regular
monitoring [47]. Scaling up the use of rapid diagnostic
tests to manage laboratory shortcomings at periphery
should considered [48].
The referral network of ten labs established in the state
through IDSP funding although a step, is sub-optimally
efficient, given that four to five districts are covered under
each RL. Second, the network is envisioned primarily for
outbreak functions leaving regular laboratory functions
still weak. A parallel strategy should be to strengthen the
District Public Health Laboratories (DPHL) available at
each district which currently covers regular surveillance
function for IDSP. Capacity building in terms of personnel
and equipment at each level should be planned conse-
quently through core state budgets to strengthen the
states laboratory infrastructure for both regular and
outbreak functions [49,50].
Electronic data processing is a major advantage in
surveillance [51]. However, the state fails to reap optimum
benefits due to interrupted Internet services, unstable
IDSP portal, poor staff training and lack of data entry op-
erators. Currently all RUs send paper forms to the DSU
and the data volume significantly overburdens the staff.
Through NRHM, two computers, broadband Internetservices, and a data entry operator have been provided to
a majority of the PHCs [52]. Secondly, under the Indian
Public Health Standards increasingly PHCs that operate
24X7 are being provided with express electricity feeders
[53]. Shifting IDSP data entry progressively from DSUs to
facility level is therefore pragmatic for several reasons.
One it is equipment and personnel wise more feasible
now than before, it eliminates the logistics, costs and bur-
den of paper based reporting to district level, improves
data quality by sheer reduction in data volume, speeds up
surveillance which can support the installation of auto-
mated outbreak and aberration detection mechanisms
within the system, and allows the DSU more time to
analyze the data as the burden of data entry is taken away.
Weak data analysis at every level was observed on our
study as from those in Ghana, Lesotho, Tanzania, Uganda
and in other states of India [7,35,42,50,54-57]. The staff at
the DSU is better trained and receives frequent feedback
from the SSU as compared to facilities giving them a
position of advantage for data analysis. However, a lack of
logistic resources and the burden of data entry prevent
them from applying their skills optimally. Developing clear
guidelines for data entry, management and analysis at
each level should be considered [2]. Additionally, regular
in-service training supported by adequate supervision of the
surveillance staff at all levels should be incorporated [39].
Irregular and ad hoc feedback was observed at all
levels in our study. Feedback at facility level was better
than that at the DSU level and reason identified included
frequent change in the SSO. At the facility level, routine
monthly review meetings conducted by the block health
officers, medical officers meetings and quarterly subcenter
staff meetings served as a platform for IDSP review but
differed from one district to the other. Feedback is an
essential component for maintaining involvement and
motivation of surveillance staff [38,56,57]. Formal mecha-
nisms should be developed with accurate guidelines for
frequency and components of feedback at all levels
(essentially on a quarterly basis for DSUs) including
budgeting for supervisory visits [4].
Training is significantly associated with data analysis,
feedback and supervision [58,59]. Training of DSO and
epidemiologists was better than that of the peripheral
staff in our study like in several others [37,60]. Lack of
adequate training schedule, funds, discrepancy with
regards to state or district responsibility and vacant state
training consultant position affected the availability of
trained personnel in our study. Institutionalizing training
for integrated disease surveillance in regular medical and
paramedical curricula is considered the most sustainable
strategy and should be incorporated [4]. Practical on-site
in-service trainings for surveillance and lab staff should
be mandatorily planned as an annual activity [59,61].
High attrition of trained staff was another reason for
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in Ethiopia and Lesotho [46,50]. A detailed updated
database of trained personnel should be maintained
at district level and trainings should be coordinated
by districts rather than the state to allow efficient
overview [27,49].
Outbreak detection and response capacity, and
rightly so, was better at the periphery compared to the
DSU level. The peripheral staff had better understand-
ing of the outbreak thresholds, was well supervised by
the THOs, and had improved access to vehicles and lo-
gistic support as compared to the DSUs. Adequate
supplies were observed at both the district and facility
levels in our study indicating sufficient resources.
Heavy focus on curative approaches and access to
treatment manuals ensured proper case management
and reductions in case fatality rates. As first responders
are always the peripheral staff, all factors, to the advantage
of the system, worked towards significantly improving
outbreak response [8].
Some of the limitations included the fact that weak
data management and analysis did not allow automated
outbreak detection despite the availability of electronic
data. This should be instated as the next step in improving
the system structure [62]. Outbreak indicators were well
understood and implemented by peripheral staff, however
poor filing of final outbreak reports jeopardized documen-
tation and hence the assessment of response adequacy
and institutional learning. A general tendency to under-
report the total number of outbreaks was observed due
to fear of action from the higher authorities. Supportive
supervision with compulsory monitoring of identified
IDSP indicators should be developed at each level to
promote collective responsibility and avoid finger
pointing [27,36,63,64].
Availability of sustainable resources (human, logistic and
equipment) are at the root of surveillance performance
[65]. Thirty per cent IDSP positions were vacant in the
state despite availability of financial resources leading to
multiple responsibilities on existing staff including the
SSO and the DSOs. A finding commonly reported from
several other low and middle income countries [66]. Further
the SSO and DSOs were selected ad-hoc, frequently
transferred and saw surveillance as an additional burden.
Contractual temporary positions are the main reason for
high turnover of lab and IDSP staff in our study. Lack of
job security, uneven and unrevised salary structure, with
administrative delays in processing contracts and monthly
pays demotivated district and facility staff to take on or
continue IDSP positions (Personal communication with
SSO). Retaining trained staff although a challenge is of
utmost importance [36,43]. Developing permanent cadre
of skilled surveillance personnel holds the key to program
viability and should be actively pursued [67].Competent staff should be backed up with appropriate
and adequate logistic and equipment support for effective
communication, laboratory function and data management
[6,41,48]. Currently, the IDSP provides annual procure-
ment costs only for referral laboratories and none for rapid
diagnostic testing at peripheral levels which should be
re-considered. Although adequate communication equip-
ment was in principle available, the availability at district
level was weaker as compared to the facility levels.
One time procurement of hardware/software for data
management was made in the initial phases of the program.
However, most equipment is now old, poorly maintained
and requires repair or replacement. Effective communica-
tion systems for data transmission determine speed and
completeness of reporting and provision of annual main-
tenance contracts for purchased equipment should be
envisaged in annual budgetary planning [50,51].
Availability of transport vehicles was weakest at
sub-centre level where staff is expected to perform
active syndromic surveillance on a bi-weekly basis.
Chronic shortage of staff in the backdrop of rapid
population growth has resulted in dis-proportionate
personnel and facility distributions making active
surveillance a horrendous task [68]. Geographical areas
are impossible to cover on foot and providing interest-free
two-wheeler loans to sub-centre staff is suggested. ASHA
(Accredited Social Health Activists) identified at the
village level have been included in the IDSP to overcome
some of these challenges and a minimal monetary
compensation is offered for every outbreak reported.
However, this arrangement is not fully exploited to its
potential in all districts and delays in payments have
affected the inclination of ASHA workers to participate.
Additionally, active involvement and community interest
should be sustained by organizing regular feedback
meetings which less than half of the facilities were
implementing in our study [57].
Vehicle availability was problematic in majority of the
DSUs in our study hindering supervision and outbreak
investigations. Similar findings have been reported from
IDS assessments in Iraq and Nigeria [37,69]. IDSP
designated vehicles should be made available on priority
basis and clear guidelines on the use of vehicle contin-
gency funds within the program should be developed.
Weak inter-sectorial and inter- programmatic coordin-
ation was observed in our study despite availability of a
designated focal person at all levels in majority of the
districts in our study like in others from Uganda, Ghana,
Ethiopia, other states in India and Mali [35,46,57,58,70].
Additionally, poor documentation of review meetings
made its functionality rather doubtful. In order to avoid
that the IDSP becomes another vertical disease surveillance
program and to eliminate existing lacunae as identified in
our study we suggest that the DSUs should be established
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system in Maharashtra. Structural integration of the IDSP
will allow gradual progressive channelling of surveillance
activities of all major vertical disease control through
these units resulting in effective coordination [36,63,70].
Further, instead of providing IDSP as an additional charge
to existing ADHOs who overlook multiple programs,
separate full time positions for SSO and 34 DSOs should
be created. An ideal strategy would be to recruit existing
contractual epidemiologists on long term or permanent
basis. Given that the salaries of these officers were borne
by the state since 2005, resources are not an issue, but the
policy is!
Conclusion
In conclusion, the findings of the study confirm that the
IDSP in Maharashtra has made satisfactory improvements
on a majority of core and support surveillance functions.
Chief amongst them are the development of standard case
definitions, laboratory manuals and adequate outbreak
response. However, data management and analysis were
weak at all levels. We note that all support functions were
key to the performance of core surveillance functions.
Specifically:
 Case and outbreak detection depended heavily on
definitions and job aids developed and on the
knowledge and skills of surveillance personnel
 Case confirmation was dependent on laboratory
infrastructure and the knowledge and skills of
laboratory personnel
 Case notification was dependent on communication
and logistic equipment available at every level
 Data management and analysis was dependent on
communication equipment and the knowledge and
skills of surveillance personnel
 All of which were primarily affected by three things
 Availability of adequate human resources
 Training of surveillance and laboratory staff
 Supervision
 FeedbackIt is essential to note here, that although laboratory
functions; feedback and training were weak at the
peripheral levels, a majority of the logistic and equipment
issues; and more importantly coordination was weak at
the district levels. Strengthening each aspect is unrealistic.
As a first step, the support functions (except financial
resources) need to be targeted for improvements.
The average performance of the IDSP, despite a well-
designed structure and the availability of adequate financial
resources indicate that certain other barriers hinder its
optimal functioning. Incomplete adoption of the original
project implementation plan, which theoretically addressesa majority of the shortcomings identified in our assessment,
is probably the main amongst them and incomplete
structural integration of the IDSP within the state health
service system the other. Given that the IDSP is now in
transition from an externally funded project to an inde-
pendent core central program in the state, structural
alignments at both ends- IDSP itself and the state health
service system which receives it are necessary. Chief
amongst them is establishing the state and district surveil-
lance units as permanent structures within the state health
infrastructure in order to avoid the integrated disease
surveillance system from ending up isolated! Improving
surveillance quality should be the next on the agenda for
the state [71].Additional file
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